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ESG and Private Ordering
Michal Barzuza,* Quinn Curtis† & David H. Webber‡
Easterbrook and Fischel’s seminal book The Economic Structure of Corporate Law has taught us the crucial role of markets in
shaping the corporate contract. With the rise of ESG, the nature of
that contract is changing, but the importance of markets (and of
their limitations) is not. In this piece, building on our previous
work that traces the remarkable growth of ESG to a shift in demand, primarily, but not solely, among millennials, we discuss the
role of markets in shaping ESG, as well as their limitations. The
rise of social values, and the increasing willingness of millennials
to act on them as market participants and corporate stakeholders,
has forced managers to respond in ways that multiply the effect of
those values. Critically, these preferences ultimately act as a constraint on firms’ behavior, and the emergence of ESG is best understood as a product of strong, though sometimes excessive, incentives to respond to social demand. Thus, conducting a context
specific incentives’ analysis, rather than assuming that markets
are always efficient or inefficient, should be preserved in the ESG
era.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Easterbrook and Fischel’s seminal book The Economic Structure of Corporate Law has taught us the crucial role of markets in
shaping the corporate contract. Markets—the market for corporate control, the labor market, capital markets, and product markets—all discipline managers to perform at their best and offer
the best package, including firm governance package, to shareholders. This insight has had crucial implications for corporate
law. Corporate law should be enabling, providing flexibility to
shareholders and managers to optimize the corporate contract.
This flexibility is nothing to fear because markets will incentivize
managers and founders to offer the governance terms that maximize firm value.1
Firms that offer inefficient terms or lose focus on shareholder
value will have a lower share price. Low share prices will attract
hostile bidders that can profit from buying control, replacing poor
management, reforming poor governance, and capturing the resulting increase in stock price. Thus, market forces inexorably
push firms toward a disciplined focus on creating value for shareholders.
Easterbrook and Fischel’s insights about the power of markets in shaping optimal corporate law remain important and influential views. American corporate law is mostly enabling, and,
three decades after its publication, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law outlines the analytical approach to corporate law,
based on contractual freedom and the centrality of shareholders,
that remains at the heart of contemporary debates. A corollary of
this important insight is that mandatory corporate law is
1
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 4 (1996) (“Managers may do their best to take advantage of their investors, but they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had investors’ interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.”).

2022]

ESG and Private Ordering

3

generally not desirable as it applies one-size-fits-all to firms that
would otherwise operationalize legal flexibility in the interests of
shareholders.2 Firms differ in their needs and structures, and a
one-size-fits-all rule is likely to do more harm than good. Instead
of offering mandatory corporate law, the role of corporate law
should be limited to offering a menu of different governance terms
that reduce the cost of contracting.
While Easterbrook and Fischel’s insight remains valid and
influential, the extent to which markets are effective in that role
has been challenged. In particular, market forces work in tension
with the agency problem, which may sometimes prevail. First,
managers’ wealth is only remotely tied to stock value.3 Second,
managers have the power to diminish market discipline with defensive tactics such as poison pills and staggered boards.4 With
respect to stakeholders, managers have especially weak incentives to maximize their value, and might use stakeholder interests to further insulate themselves from market forces.5
***
In recent years we have seen an emergence of private ordering of ESG. Most famously, the Business Roundtable issued a
statement in 2019 that affirmed that companies have a “fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders”6 (emphasis in original). This public embrace of stakeholders by an influential group
of large-company CEOs was a marked shift in at least the rhetoric
around shareholder centrality. The Business Roundtable statement did not happen in a vacuum. The public embrace of stakeholders coincided with rapidly increasing emphasis on ESG issues
among investors, consumers, and business leaders. In the Easterbrook and Fischel framework the corporate contract was not limited to managers and shareholders. Rather, a nexus of contracts,
between managers, shareholders, employees, and other relevant

2
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract] (“No
one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ structure of corporate law.”); see
also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 2.
3
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1841–43 (1989).
4
Id. at 1843–44.
5
See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. CALIF.
L. REV. 1467 (2021).
6
Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (emphasis added), https://perma.cc/3YD6XQZC (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
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constituencies will evolve as an efficient corporate contract. Is the
recent rise of ESG an optimal contract that maximizes shareholder value? Or are managers seizing on ESG to shirk their accountability, as some have argued?7
We think the answer to both questions is “no.” In this piece,
we argue that the striking rise of ESG, the most significant development in corporate law and finance in recent years, is a demand-driven phenomenon. Thus, unlike in the past when managers promoted semi-ESG initiations to further insulate
themselves, now they mostly respond to outside pressures. Yet,
the bottom up pressure on managers, as we showed, while sometimes directed at maximizing value, and other times at genuine
environmental or social goals, can also lead to excessive, misdirected, or defensive ESG in the self-interest of CEOs and fund
managers.
In particular, building on our prior work on the importance
of millennials to index fund ESG incentives (Shareholder
Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance), and CEOs’ ESG incentives (The Millennial
Corporation: Strong Stakeholders, Weak Managers), we show that
the rise of ESG is a market response to shifting demand from investors, consumers, and employees driven by, but not limited to
the millennial generation.8
The “millennials markets”—their consumption, employment,
and investment choices—and, more importantly, with their use of
social media, and their willingness to boycott, walkout and cancel,
create powerful incentives for CEOs to promote ESG. As in the
Easterbrook and Fischel framework, CEOs may promote ESG to
maximize profits from consumption, employment, and investment. However, CEOs also respond to the personal magnified risk
from cancel culture, boycotts and walkouts. Furthermore, millennial preferences also affect investment funds’ managers, whose
incentives are skewed toward attracting assets, rather than
7
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2020); Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
8
Michal Barzuza et al., The Millennial Corporation: Strong Stakeholders, Weak
Managers (Sept. 6, 2021), https://perma.cc/GLP6-B4VV (unpublished manuscript); see also
Michal Barzuza et al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1243 (2020) (arguing and bringing evidence to show that Index Funds compete on ESG branding to attract and retain millennials); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value, 2 J.L., FIN., & ACCT. 247 (2017); Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, Corporate Governance Gaming: The Collective Power of Retail Investors,
22 NEV. L.J. 51 (2022) (arguing that younger retail investors use technology to promote
social and environmental goals).
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maximizing their value, and who in turn pressure management
to promote ESG. Activist hedge funds leverage ESG goals to gain
funds’ support for their activism, as in the recent Engine No. 1
campaign at Exxon.9 ESG funds attract other investors that wish
to benefit from the premium millennials pay for high-ESG stock
(the “millennial premium”), who further bolster the price of ESG
stock and the volume of investments in it.
In unpacking ESG as a market phenomenon, we illustrate
the enduring importance of Easterbrook and Fischel in centering
markets and flexibility in corporate law. The same framework
that explains the leveraged buyouts of the 80’s and the fixation
on share price of the 90’s can accommodate the emphasis on environmental, social, and stakeholder goals that dominates the corporate law conversation today. At the same time, we also highlight the limits of their theory, and mostly of their assumption
that the corporate contract results in shareholder- maximizing
outcomes.
The fact that ESG is driven by demand has important implications for corporate law and finance. First, unlike previous instances when ESG was driven exclusively by managers who utilized it primarily to insulate themselves, the current ESG
movement actually tends to produce results for stakeholders: for
example, board diversity has increased significantly in recent
years, and firms have significantly increased disclosures related
to ESG goals.
Second, the effects of markets and demand, however, are not
necessarily efficient. CEOs’ incentives to mitigate personal risks
may result in excessive or misdirected ESG, having net negative
social value, harming shareholder value with little or no social
payoff. Similarly, Big Three managerial incentives to attract assets regardless of, and even at the expense of, share value may
lead to further pressure on managers to promote excessive or defensive ESG. Third, the ESG movement has a more complicated
relationship with firm value than its most ardent adherents have
suggested. On the one hand, market demand for ESG helps mitigate the long-standing distinction between values and returns.
Firms that are not responsive to the demand for ESG have difficulties selling their products, recruiting talent, and attracting investments. They will sell at lower prices and pay higher salaries.
Their profits will decline, and their stock will be traded at a
9
The Little Engine that Could: ExxonMobil Loses a Proxy Fight with Green Investors, ECONOMIST (May 29, 2021) (“An activist hedge fund succeeds in nominating at least
two climate-friendly directors to the energy giant’s board.”), https://perma.cc/QFW3-X9U5.
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discount. On the other hand, because ESG commitments are
rooted in social preferences that operate as constraints on firms,
there is no ex-ante reason to believe that the effect of these preferences will be to increase share price relative to a world in which
different (perhaps more selfish) preferences prevail. Investment
management in an ESG world is an exercise in constrained optimization.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I gives an overview of
the relevant contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel in understanding corporate law. Part II describes the transition of ESG
from the margins to the center of corporate law. Part III argues
that the rise of ESG is best understood as a market response to
shifting demand. We conclude by arguing that conducting a context specific incentives’ analysis, rather than assuming that markets are always efficient or inefficient, should be preserved in the
ESG era.
II. MARKETS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND ESG
A. Easterbrook & Fischel’s Seminal Contribution–Markets and
Corporate Governance
The market for capital is just that–a market. On one side of
the exchange is the capital needed for a business to grow, and on
the other is a share of the business itself, structured in such a way
as to make it maximally attractive to its potential purchasers.
While every firm is subject to a variety of agency problems, the
capital markets will put inexorable pressure on managers to find
credible ways to reduce them. As Easterbrook and Fischel elegantly and succinctly put it in their seminal book:
Just as the founders of a firm have incentives to make the
kinds of sewing machines people want to buy, they have incentives to create the kind of firm, governance structure, and
securities the customers in capital markets want. The founders of the firm will find it profitable to establish the governance structure that is most beneficial to investors, net of the
costs of maintaining the structure.10
And this set of incentives promotes socially optimal investment.
The firms and managers that make the choices investors prefer will prosper relative to others. Because the choices do not
impose costs on strangers to the contracts, what is optimal
10

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 4–5.
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for the firms and investors is optimal for society. We can
learn a great deal just by observing which devices are widely
used and which are not.11
While Easterbrook and Fischel’s insight that markets incentivize managers to offer value-enhancing governance remains
valid and influential, the extent to which markets are effective in
that role has been challenged. Most notably, Lucian Bebchuk has
argued that the market discipline thesis is limited by several factors.12 To begin with, managers diminish the power of the market
for corporate control with defensive tactics such as poison pills
and staggered boards.13 Second, managers’ wealth is only remotely tied to stock value.14 Third, many firms do not operate in
competitive markets, but rather possess monopoly power, and accordingly enjoy monopolistic slack—with leeway to perform in
less than optimal efficiency.15 Lax corporate governance allows
managers to extract private benefits that may exceed their share
in the harm to their firm and its stock value. 16
Indeed, we argue, markets work differently in the ESG
framework than in the Easterbrook and Fischel framework. In
their framework, markets respond only to profitability and thus
care about governance indirectly. In our framework, consumers,
employees, and investors care about ESG directly, as part of their
utility function. Accordingly, firms respond to it directly and
firmly. In Easterbrook and Fischel, market discipline hinges on
firm value. If firms offer poor governance, their stock value will
decline and thus also their ability to raise capital and to be profitable. Yet, as the critique suggests, the extent to which managers
care about market price is limited.
The product market didn’t care about governance and neither
did the capital market. Millennials, on the other hand, care about
ESG beyond just its effect on profitability and returns. Thus,
managers face direct discipline to promote ESG, which power is
not contingent on managers responsiveness to their firms’ stock
value.
This magnified discipline, however, does not necessarily lead
to shareholder maximizing outcomes. As a context-specific incentives analysis shows, while it may produce value to stakeholders,
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 6–7.
See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1840–46.
Id. at 1843–44.
Id. at 1841–43.
Id. at 1845–46.
Id. at 1840–41.
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it could also lead to excessive or defensive ESG, overinvestment,
or greenwashing.
III. EXPLAINING THE RISE OF ESG
A. ESG Takes Center Stage
The focus on environmental, social, and governance issues is
an unmissable characteristic of the modern corporate landscape.
While corporate obligations to stakeholders other than shareholders have always been a point of emphasis among environmental
advocates, union and public pension funds,17 and corporate reformers, it is striking that the new wave of ESG has swept in
large, conventional asset managers like BlackRock and State
Street, as well as a smattering of hedge funds, venture capital
funds, and others.
While it is challenging to pinpoint the start of the modern
ESG movement, one might point to State Street and BlackRock’s
efforts to address a lack of gender diversity on public company
boards as a seminal moment.18 While not first-movers in the push
for greater diversity, the entry of these asset managers signaled
an important shift for several reasons. First, it signaled that conventional asset managers were taking an interest in social issues.
Second, the funds framed the issue in terms of shareholder value,
aligning social goals with shareholder welfare. Finally, the fund
families didn’t just pay lip service to the goal of board diversity,
but put real teeth behind their demands with numerical thresholds and a demonstrated willingness to back up their demands
with withhold votes.
Index funds are a somewhat surprising source for change of
any kind. While index funds might, through exercising shareholder stewardship, improve the companies in which they hold
significant stakes, such improvement would increase the value of
all funds tracking the index, while the costs would be borne by
the fund or subset of funds tackling the activist pressure. As such,
one might expect index funds to be relatively passive

17 DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST
BEST WEAPON 162 (2018) (describing public pension fund and labor fund shareholder activism).
18 State Street Fearless Girl campaign was launched on Women’s International Day
in March 2017.

2022]

ESG and Private Ordering

9

shareholders.19 Nevertheless, the immense asset base of index
funds put substantial shareholder power behind ESG goals.
If index funds’ activism around ESG issues had been limited
to board diversity, it is doubtful that ESG would play as significant a role in the corporate governance discussion. But they followed the board diversity push with pressure on firms to address
issues related to climate change, suggesting that their interest in
socially responsible investing was not idiosyncratic but a new fixture in markets.
What followed was an explosion of interest in ESG. Data providers like Standard and Poor’s, ISS, and MSCI delivered detailed
metrics aimed at various components of ESG risk. Index providers built specialized ESG indices. Specialized ESG mutual funds
became the fastest-growing segment of the industry.20 And, as
outlined above, regulators took notice. Law firms, accounting
firms, and management consultants rushed to advise firms on
how to respond.
And other asset managers entered the fray. In the highestprofile case of ESG activism, the small hedge fund Engine No. 1
won a proxy fight against Exxon, replacing multiple directors,
with an activist pitch heavy on ESG arguments related to climate
change. This successful fight, backed by ISS, Glass Lewis, and the
big index funds, may serve as a template for shareholder activism
going forward.
B. Explanations for the Rise of ESG
Unsurprisingly, academics and others have offered a number
of explanations for the rise of ESG. ESG-oriented asset managers
have advocated ESG as a means of promoting long-term value,
suggesting that there is no conflict in the long-term between environmental stewardship, employee welfare, and shareholder
value. State Street writes of its investing philosophy:
As supported by an abundance of research, we believe that
companies that are managed responsibly and adhere to high
environmental, social and governance standards deliver better financial results over the long-term and are well-positioned to withstand emerging risks and capitalize on new opportunities. As such, we believe we have a responsibility as
19 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019).
20 Quinn Curtis et al., Do ESG Funds Deliver on Their Promises?, 120 MICH. L. REV.
393 (2021).
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an asset manager to integrate sustainability risk and opportunities into investment decision-making alongside traditional investment analysis.21
This language is typical of the host of asset managers—as well as
data providers and other denizens of the ESG space—who advocate ESG-focused approaches as simply the correct way to generate returns. The idea that ESG, or at least some versions of it, are
a subspecies of shareholder primacy is present in the academic
literature as well. Professors Bebchuk and Tallarita characterize
common approaches to ESG as “instrumental stakeholderism,” or
“enlightened shareholder value.”22 Professors Lund and Pollman
describe how the shareholder-focused corporate governance ecosystem converts ESG’s would-be-stakeholder focus to a fixation
on shareholder value.23
Other accounts identify more concerning forces at work in the
rise of ESG. One argument is that ESG provides cover to reduce
managerial accountability to shareholders—benefiting managers, not stakeholders.24 Professor Roe has suggested that accommodating ESG goals reflects competitive slack due to market concentration.25 In another account, ESG rose as backlash to political
disfunction following the financial crisis politics.26 And of course,
there is the ever-present possibility that corporate commitments
to ESG goals are nothing more than cheap-talk greenwashing by
companies that seek to stave off public censure or regulation without actually changing practices. Finally, on another account, ESG
merely maximizes shareholder value.
Indeed, the rise of ESG can be squared with Easterbrook and
Fischel’s account of the corporate contract and managers’ fiduciary duties. As Easterbrook and Fischel pointed out, there is nothing inconsistent about the idea that running the firm in the interest of shareholders requires carefully considering the interests of
21

ESG Investment Statement, STATE ST. (Oct. 2021), https://perma.cc/QVP7-3MTR.
Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 7, at 108.
23 Dorothy S. Lund & Elizabeth Pollman, The Corporate Governance Machine, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 2563 (2021).
24 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 7; Bebchuk et al., supra note 5.
25 Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 601/2021, 2021).
26 Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over
Corporate Purpose 5 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 515/2020,
2020) (“The various efforts to bring greater attention to ‘ESG’ or ‘Environmental Social
and Governance’ matters in the boardroom, including a board level focus on climate
change, diversity and human capital, are of a piece with the effort to converge on a more
sustainable system.”).
22
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other stakeholders to the extent they are key contributors to firm
value.
On the other hand, the more skeptical views, too, apply in the
context of ESG. Managerial self-interest, the classic corporate law
agency problem, and one that plays no small role in the critique
of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, also arises in the
ESG context.
C. Challenges to Existing Accounts
To summarize, we observe a widespread focus on ESG among
corporate managers, passive institutional shareholders, and at
least some hedge fund activists. Explanations for the prevalence
of ESG include the notion that ESG is simply shareholder primacy by another name or that it arises as a tool to insulate managers from the influence of markets.
In our view, the evidence is inconsistent with a managerialist
account of the rise of ESG. While there may be instances in which
managers benefit from ESG’s attention to multiple stakeholders,
recent events suggest that ESG does not expand managerial discretion as it did in the past. In many ways it even constrains it.
When proxy contests regularly cite ESG failures and when ESG
shareholder proposals pass with broad support over the objection
of management, it seems clear that ESG commitments are being
embraced by shareholders. To be sure, there may be some instances in which managers will use ESG to insulate themselves.
Yet, there is also clearly an opposite effect, as ESG has been utilized by activist hedge funds to leverage their power and influence.
The idea that ESG is merely greenwashing or politically correct window-dressing also seems in tension with the evidence. To
be sure, there will always be some cheap talk around social and
environmental commitments, but what is notable about the current ESG movement is its fixation on transparency, measurement, and progress. As noted above, the campaign to diversify
boards focused on specific numerical goals. More broadly, an entire industry has sprung up scoring firms’ ESG status on hundreds of dimensions, and firms that fall short or fail to disclose
have faced shareholder backlash.
Nor has investors’ approach been characterized by cheap
talk. While interest in ESG surged during the Trump administration, investors and financial firms faced significant regulatory
pushback and nevertheless remained committed to advising ESG
goals. In 2018, the DOL reminded retirement plan fiduciaries
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that they “are not permitted to sacrifice investment return or take
on additional investment risk as a means of using plan investments to promote collateral social policy goals.”27 In 2020, the
DOL released a proposed rule that would have sharply curtailed
the ability of asset managers serving retirement accounts, including many mutual funds, to explicitly consider ESG factors.28
While the final Trump Administration rule29 took a more neutral
approach, it was nevertheless framed as a response to the rise of
ESG investing. (The Trump rule was never actually implemented,
as the Biden Administration announced that it would not enforce
it and is still in the process of rewriting it.)30
The pushback to ESG was not limited to investment funds.
Banks, which had increasingly been pressed to address their role
in financing carbon-intensive activities, found themselves in the
crosshairs as well. The Trump OCC “Fair Access to Financial Services” rule,31 aimed to pressure banks to continue extending credit
to industries that had been attracting ESG criticism, including
energy and firearms.32 The rule was viewed as a direct response
to the ESG movement and was widely opposed by banks and investment firms.33

27 John J. Canary, Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2018–01, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Apr.
23, 2018), https://perma.cc/5ZB8-TY9J.
28 Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113 (proposed
June 30, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
29 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509, 2550 (2022).
30 Tara Siegel Bernard, The Labor Department Will Not Enforce Two Trump-Era
Rules Regulating Retirement Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/7YUW5JKC.
31 OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FAIR ACCESS TO FINANCIAL
SERVICES (Jan. 13, 2021) (rule finalized but never published or codified),
https://perma.cc/39AD-7GQD. While this rule did become final, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency paused publication of the rule before it became effective.
32 Eric Rosenbaum, Trump Bank Regulator’s New Rule Incurs Wall Street and Climate Investor Ire on His Way Out the Door, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2021, 12:47 PM),
https://perma.cc/ZT8X-Z8LR.
33 Id.
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The Biden administration, by contrast, has been aggressive
in advancing ESG goals, including in a new DOL rule strongly
backing ESG34 and numerous ESG initiatives at the SEC.35
These examples of regulatory push and pull are telling for
three reasons. First, they are inconsistent with the idea of ESG
as harmless greenwashing or management window dressing. If
ESG were simply marketing spin, there would be little reason for
even skeptical regulators to engage it. If anything, allowing such
“thin” ESG to continue might lower the demand for other regulatory interventions aimed at climate and other issues. Second, the
anti-ESG regulations were aimed at investors and banks—financial intermediaries—suggesting that regulators saw ESG pressure as external to most firms. This, again, is inconsistent with
the concept of ESG as primarily embraced by management,
whether because of managerial agency problems or firm market
power, as opposed to other stakeholders. Third, it seems clear
that both pro- and anti-ESG initiatives from two administrations
have done little or nothing to slow the adoption of ESG, suggesting that the commitments to ESG goals are at least sincere
enough to thrive amid regulatory scrutiny and are not merely a
response to the Trump administration.
If ESG is neither managerial power run amok nor window
dressing, then should we embrace the argument of ESG investoradvocates that ESG is simply the smart way to manage money in
the long term? We think it is unduly reductive to treat all ESG
interventions as oriented to improving enterprise value. While
the diversification of boards of directors is surely an important
social movement, the finance literature linking such reforms to
firm value is ambiguous at best.36 Given the relatively attenuated
incentives of index funds to intervene in corporate governance at
all,37 their choice to focus on board diversity as an initial foray into

34 Prudence and Loyalty in Selecting Plan Investments and Exercising Shareholder
Rights, 86 Fed. Reg. 57272 (proposed Oct. 14, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
For a comment by one of us encouraging the DOL to do more to protect consideration of
workers in plan investment decisions, see David H. Webber, New Department of Labor
Investment Rules Could Be Big Win for Everyone but Labor, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar.
28, 2022) (citing Letter from David H. Webber, Professor of L., Bos. Univ., to Off. of Regul.
& Interpretations, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Dec. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/6LKT-NDJ7),
https://perma.cc/4HDR-XT84.
35 SEC Responses to Climate and ESG Risks and Opportunities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Oct. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/YM3R-8SV2.
36 Jesse M. Fried, Will Nasdaq’s Diversity Rules Harm Investors? (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 579/2021, 2021); Barzuza et al., supra note 8.
37 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 19.
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activism is hard to square solely with a commitment to increasing
returns.
At the firm level, engagement with salient social issues also
raises questions about the impact on stock price of, for example,
corporate responses to the Black Lives Matter movement,38 or redstate voting restrictions39 that risked (and in the case of voting
restrictions resulted in) backlash. While certainly cognizable under the “S” in “ESG,” these instances of corporate political engagement are best understood as managers responding to significant
immediate pressure, often from employees, rather than arising
out of a long-term strategy to create shareholder value in the abstract. It appears that stakeholder social concerns are functioning
as a constraint on management in such cases.
Indeed, as we show, managers may invest firms’ resources in
ESG to promote stakeholder interests but also to mitigate personal risk to their reputation and career concerns.
IV. MILLENNIAL MARKETS–THE DEMAND FOR ESG
We argue that the rise of ESG is traceable, not to managerial
attempts to insulate themselves from market forces, nor to maximizing firms’ long term shareholder value. Instead, we argue
that the rise of ESG is traceable to an important shift in demand,
and in turn, in incentives. In particular, corporate stakeholders,
and the millennial generation in particular (though not exclusively), are increasingly willing to act on preferences regarding
social, environmental, and worker-welfare consequences of corporate actions. This tendency, with an assist from social media, has
given non-shareholder stakeholders leverage over firm behaviors
and essentially forced managers to be attentive to ESG issues as
a matter of preserving traditional firm value, altering traditional
notions of firm value—and, equally important, their safeguarding
and advancing their own careers. And the demand for ESG has
created incentives to index funds managers to promote ESG as
means to preserve or increase their assets under management,
regardless of, and sometimes at the expense of, shareholder
value.
We have previously identified index funds’ market incentives
as the cause of their embrace of ESG goals. Subsequent events
38 Heather Haddon, Starbucks, in Reversal, to Distribute ‘Black Lives Matter’ Shirts
to Baristas, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2020, 5:25 PM), https://perma.cc/5UNC-B353.
39 See Thomas Pallini, Delta Spent the Pandemic Earning Goodwill from Passengers
and Workers. It Might Be About to Vanish, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 3, 2021, 6:38 AM),
https://perma.cc/CL58-DJP2.
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have borne out that theory, but it is clear now that index funds
are not the sole, or even the most important, channel through
which firms have been forced to respond to the governance preferences of the millennial generation. CEOs must now grapple
with millennials as employees and consumers as well as index investors. Moreover, the investment community at large has taken
notice of the potential financial impact of millennial preferences,
meaning that even investors without a direct commitment to ESG
goals nevertheless must account for the reality of ESG risks, unless they are for some reason immune to social preferences
through any channel. Moreover, now that the market has begun
to respond to millennial preferences, others have shown a willingness to press corporations on social goals, increasing the scope
and degree of pressure on firms.
Put simply, our view is that the current focus on ESG among
investors is a private ordering phenomenon driven by shifting demand, transmitted through a number of increasingly effective
channels, ultimately acting as a constraint on corporate behavior.
Yet, as we have shown, these effects go far and beyond incentives
to maximize share value. They may directly cater to the interests
of powerful stakeholders. They also create personal incentives for
managers to mitigate personal risks to their reputation and career prospects.
A. Millennial Preferences and Markets
Born between 1981 and 1996, Millennials represent the largest generation in US history.40 Combined with their ideological
compatriots in Gen Z, they already represent a majority of the US
population.41 Millennials numerosity is matched by economic
might that has not escaped the attention of asset managers.
While Millennials wield considerable wealth already, they also
stand to inherit from their Baby Boom parents in what will be
“the largest transfer of wealth in history,”42 in the words of
Blackrock CEO Larry Fink.
But what truly sets the Millennials, and now Gen Z, apart is
their willingness to act on their political and social values in making economic decisions as consumers, employees, and investors,
40 Millennials Coming of Age, GOLDMAN SACHS (“The Millennial generation is the
biggest in US history . . . .”), https://perma.cc/G8XQ-UX3T (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
41 William H. Frey, Now, More than Half of Americans Are Millennials or Younger,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/CMB8-GPQK.
42 Profit & Purpose: Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK [hereinafter Profit
& Purpose], https://perma.cc/T5ZV-BM2X (last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
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and more importantly, in boycotting and canceling, and in their
extensive use of social media to promote their goals.
Thus, there is basis to the argument that to a certain level
ESG is now a component of a shareholder value maximization
strategy. On the employment front, millennials are perceived to
seek out workplaces that share their values.43 For technology and
other firms that heavily rely on a Millennial workforce, managers
argue, aligning with their social values is a matter of economic
survival. Facebook, for example, has arguably struggled mightily
to recruit talent in the fallout of the Cambridge Analytica scandal.44 Facing fierce competition with other technology giants for
talent, “struggling to recruit” could translate into higher salaries
for the same set of skills. Conversely, companies that manage to
align themselves with Millennial values may be able to pay less.
Philipp Krueger, Daniel Metzger, and Jiaxin Wu find that companies in sustainable industries are able to attract talent while
offering lower salaries.45 Recent field experiments suggest similar
dynamics.46
Millennials might behave similarly in product markets. Numerous industry reports, the types of research likely to form the
basis of corporate strategies, point to young consumers’ appetite
for brands they associate with their social values.47 While some

43 Afdhel Aziz, The Power of Purpose: The Business Case for Purpose (All the Data
You Were Looking For Pt 2), FORBES (Mar. 7, 2020, 12:04 PM), https://perma.cc/5WYTD973.
44 Salvador Rodriguez, Facebook Has Struggled to Hire Talent Since the Cambridge
Analytica Scandal, According to Recruiters Who Worked There, CNBC (May 16, 2019, 2:58
PM), https://perma.cc/N27M-Y6SQ.
45 Philipp Krueger et al., The Sustainability Wage Gap (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 718/2020, 2020) (“We hypothesize that this Sustainability
Wage Gap arises because workers, especially those with higher skills and from younger
cohorts, value environmental sustainability and accept lower wages to work in more environmentally sustainable firms and sectors. Accordingly, we find that the Sustainability
Wage Gap is larger for high-skilled workers and increasing over time.”).
46 See Daniel Hedblom et al., Toward an Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 26222, 2021); see also Vanessa Burbano, Getting Gig Workers to Do More by
Doing Good: Field Experimental Evidence from Online Platform Labor Marketplaces,
34 ORG. & ENV’T 387 (2021) (conducting two field experiments and finding that providing
gig workers with information about employer charity contribution increases their willingness to do extra work).
47 See, e.g., 66% of Consumers Willing to Pay More for Sustainable Goods, Nielsen
Report Reveals, ASHTON MFG., https://perma.cc/BTD5-JUPD (last visited Feb. 9, 2022);
Two-Thirds of Consumers Worldwide Now Buy on Beliefs, EDELMAN (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://perma.cc/WVG3-X2KQ; PORTER NOVELLI, 2021 BUSINESS OF CANCEL CULTURE
STUDY 8–9 (Jan. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/A2MC-JA7J; Afdhel Aziz, The Power of Purpose: The Business Case for Purpose (All The Data You Were Looking For Pt 1), FORBES
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social commitments take the form of relatively thin marketing,
there are numerous examples of companies who fail to deliver on
social commitments being called out with serious corporate consequences.
Importantly, these social preferences not only act to create
brand affinity, but also to destroy it—often irrevocably.48 The
“cancel culture” social media dynamic that has been observed repeatedly in non-economics contexts, operates in the world of consumer brands as well. For example, Oatly, a vegan milk brand
with ESG-forward marketing, faced withering consumer criticism
and a boycott after selling a stake to the private equity group
Blackstone, which activists argued (incorrectly, as it turned out)
was involved in the destruction of the Amazon rainforest.49
More important, however, these visible examples pose personal risk to CEOs’ reputation and career prospects. Risk averse
managers are aware of the potential consequences of being on the
wrong side of a social media campaign. To mitigate their personal,
non-diversifiable risk, CEOs may rationally use corporate resources to promote, sometimes appropriately, sometimes excessively, ESG goals
B. ESG Pressures from Indirect Channels
CEOs also feel indirect pressures to promote ESG, which
pressures do not necessarily align with maximizing value. Increasingly, asset managers are internalizing Millennial values
because they believe in them, or because they seek to attract Millennial assets, or because they are sensitive to the risks posed by
ESG problems at portfolio firms, and partially because they are
sensitive to the risk/opportunity to lose/gain assets under management.
As we have previously argued,50 a key channel through which
Millennial preferences impact firms is the immense shareholder
power of index funds. Because funds tracking the same index are
more or less commodities that compete only on costs, and because
costs are already quite low, index-oriented asset managers have
strong incentives to seek differentiation. Index fund ESG engagement can be understood as an attractive source of differentiation,
(Mar. 7, 2020, 12:06 PM), https://perma.cc/TJ3J-2XWM (citing CONE/PORTER NOVELLI,
2018 PURPOSE STUDY, https://perma.cc/U3L6-S729 (last visited Feb. 8, 2022)).
48 Kian Bakhtiari, Why Brands Need to Pay Attention to Cancel Culture, FORBES
(Sept. 29, 2020, 6:32 PM), https://perma.cc/FX82-7S54.
49 Id.
50 Barzuza et al., supra note 8.
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as these funds must vote proxies in any case, and engaging on
socially salient issues popular with young current and future investors may provide a competitive edge. Indeed, commentators in
the asset management industry have identified Millennials as a
driving force behind the rapid growth of ESG, both in the indexed
and non-indexed sectors.51
But index funds are not the only financial powerhouses putting pressure on firms to address ESG issues. Activist hedge
funds have long been the most direct threat to management’s preferred policies and have not hesitated to run campaigns aimed at
improving corporate performance. Now, an increasing number of
hedge funds are speaking the language of ESG. There is no more
striking example of this than the Engine No. 1 campaign at
Exxon.
***
In the highest-profile activism event to date, Engine No 1., a
small hedge fund with a tiny stake, successfully unseated three
Exxon directors in a proxy fight that focused largely on climate
change.52 Wachtell Lipton observed in a firm memo:
The bottom line is this: A newly launched and virtually unknown hedge fund with a tiny stake in a massive global enterprise managed to leverage environmental and governance
issues into winning three board seats at the annual meeting,
displacing three incumbent directors, and is now in a position
to influence the strategic direction of the company.53
Engine No. 1’s small position, coupled with its strong ESG message, proved persuasive to major shareholders, and may provide
a template for future activism, putting additional ESG pressure
on managers. “Engine No. 1 has shown that a smaller position,
coupled with a compelling ESG issue, could be sufficient to win a
campaign . . . . Boards cannot afford to ignore the issues raised by
activists, even little-known funds.”54

51 Millennials Are a Driving Factor in the Growth Behind ESG Investments,
NASDAQ (May 25, 2021, 11:39 AM), https://perma.cc/WDF5-5FVD.
52 The Little Engine that Could, supra note 9 (“An activist hedge fund succeeds in
nominating at least two climate-friendly directors to the energy giant’s board.”).
53 David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, EESG Activism After ExxonMobil, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/3RKG-YRXN.
54 Lindsay Frost, Activist Hedge Funds Increasingly ESG Converts, AGENDA (July
26, 2021), https://perma.cc/UUC4-DK82.
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Even in more conventional cases of activism, we see activists
cite ESG issues as part of the reason for a needed change. For
example, Peloton, now trading below its IPO price, drew fire from
Blackwells Capital, which, among a litany of complaints, noted
that the company “received the worst possible score for environmental disclosure and governance risk, and nearly the worst possible score for social and human rights disclosure, from a respected proxy advisory and governance firm.”55 This fusion of ESG
and conventional firm performance complaints is portentous for
managers of struggling firms. Companies with lagging stock
prices that also fail on board diversity, ESG disclosure, or related
issues are increasingly likely to become activist targets.
The rise of hedge funds as ESG activists is perhaps even more
surprising than index funds. Hedge funds have frequently been
critiqued as short-term biased, and empirical evidence has suggested that some hedge fund interventions have come at the expense of employees. Hedge funds, with their supercharged compensation incentives are among the sharper practitioners of
capitalism in the economy and so the embrace of ESG among a
subset of them is notable. Of course, that index funds and hedge
funds are both turning to ESG is unlikely to be a coincidence.
While index funds are the largest pools of assets in the capital
markets, hedge funds play a critical role in shareholder activism
by leading proxy contests and pressing firms for changes. Of
course, there is an interaction between hedge funds and index
funds, because hedge fund activism relies on the support of passive asset managers in order to succeed. It is therefore not surprising that hedge funds have begun to embrace ESG.
But even if hedge funds are foregrounding ESG in campaigns
mainly in an effort to draw the support of mutual fund investors,
who are in turn attempting to woo Millennial assets, the fact remains that managers are receiving pressure from all sides: the
labor market, the product market, and the capital markets. Market forces have coalesced around ESG, putting overwhelming
pressure on managers to respond. Indeed, the engagement of
hedge funds with ESG is a remarkable convergence between the
conventional mechanics of corporate control as outlined by
Easterbrook and Fischel, and longstanding concerns about stakeholder welfare.

55 Blackwells Sends Letter to Peloton Board of Directors, Calling for New Leadership
and Initiation of Strategic Alternatives, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 24, 2022, 7:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/8MTY-7YYX.
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C. The Market for ESG
Many institutional investors would argue that there is no
tension between their ESG agenda and the long-term financial
performance of target companies. For example, State Street wrote
in their Corporate Responsibility Report: “[O]ur singular focus is
on long-term value creation. . . . That is why our asset management business has been stressing ESG issues . . . .”56 Others, including regulators,57 have viewed such claims skeptically. Does it
make sense for a company like Exxon to commit to decarbonization? Can it really be the case that there is no tension between
the social and environmental goals of ESG investors and the stock
price of individual companies?
Our understanding of the ESG movement as a market-oriented phenomenon arising out of the social and environmental
preferences of stakeholders helps resolve this tension. For ESG to
be a successful investment strategy, it needn’t be the case that, in
a vacuum, the optimum approach (in the long-term shareholder
value sense) to running the firm is to perform well along various
ESG dimensions. Rather, investors are pressing ESG because
they believe an ESG-forward approach is the optimal solution to
the constrained optimization problem where the preferences of
stakeholders with genuine—and growing—leverage must be, to
some degree, accommodated.
Put another way, if firms were a black box where the environmental impact of their operations and conditions of their
workers deep in the supply chain were invisible to investors, consumers, and professional employees, it may well be in the longterm interest of shareholders to cast-aside ESG considerations.58
But firms have never been less of a black box, and their ESG failures do have consequences for employment and consumption
choices. Taking these market realities as given, capital markets
are merely responding in a way that they expect will maximize
shareholder and even stakeholder welfare, broadly understood.59
This market-oriented approach also helps address any lingering skepticism that ESG is exclusively greenwashing and cheap
talk. ESG-preferences are functioning as a constraint on
56 STATE
ST.,
2018
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT
4
(2019),
https://perma.cc/GZ5H-3HVC.
57 See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113 (proposed
June 30, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
58 This is a claim we suspect many of the investors pressing ESG would not concede,
as many of their arguments suggest that ESG is a first-best approach to firm governance.
59 Hart & Zingales, supra note 8, at 15.

2022]

ESG and Private Ordering

21

managers in much the same way that Easterbrook and Fischel
identified the market for corporate control as a constraint. Managers in the ESG era are not relieved of obligations to shareholders, but the relative power—and desire—of shareholders to have
the firm run solely in their interest has declined. Moreover, other
stakeholders’ interests are being pressed by sophisticated investors wielding conventional shareholder power and armed with an
ever-increasing panopticon of firm-specific information about
ESG practices. Market-discipline around ESG is complex, but
real. If we may paraphrase Easterbrook and Fischel, “[m]anagers
may do their best to take advantage of their [stakeholders], but
they find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if
they had [stakeholders’] interests at heart. It is almost as if there
were an invisible hand.”60
However, while managers now have incentives to promote
stakeholder interests, these incentives are not necessarily optimal under traditional notions of firm value, though they may be
becoming increasingly acceptable under evolving notions of firm
value. As we showed in a previous work, the demand for ESG
gives rise to a new manifestation of the agency problem: excessive
or defensive ESG.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Thus, our analysis that ESG is driven by markets starts by
observing that shifting preferences are creating new market incentives, which interact in novel and important ways. ESG preferences are transmitted to managers through a variety of channels, including not just the employment market and product
market, but also through the capital markets. The latter includes
both investors with preferences other than maximizing returns,
and investors who seek only to maximize returns but recognize
that the shift in preferences we document represents a significant
source of business risk. As a result, managers face demands for
ESG performance on all fronts, creating very strong incentives.
A. Measurable Achievements
The most important implication of this analysis is that we
expect ESG pressure to deliver concrete, meaningful results. As
already noted, managers face pressure not just from consumers,
but from investors (both passive and activist), and employees.

60

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 4.
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These constituencies have vocally demanded the incorporation of
ESG considerations into corporate decision-making.
Firms are in the process of diversifying their boards. Index
funds pressure was associated with an accelerated pace of board
diversification. In response to the BLM protests following the
murder of George Floyd, many firms added directors from racial
minorities to their board, and in some cases even increased their
size of the board to facilitate nominations. In 2021, 72% of newly
nominated directors were female or unrepresented minorities.
And firms subjected to ESG pressure have also made progress on
climate disclosure. One study even found that fund campaigns on
the environment were associated with declines in carbon emissions of firms they held.61
B. ESG for the Long Haul?
Will these incentives prove durable? An implication of our
analysis is that the market for ESG will only last as long as the
preferences that underlie it. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that
the current ESG movement will prove be more sustainable than
past instances in which corporations embraced social goals. As
outlined above, Millennials appear distinctly different from their
generational forebears when it comes to market behavior. Moreover, the claim that their leftward tilt will inevitably dissipate as
they age may be more folktale than social science.62
Nevertheless, the future is hard to predict, and intervening
events could shift preferences in unpredictable ways. Understanding ESG as a product of private ordering, though, suggests
at least that the ESG movement is more than window-dressing,
cheap talk, or management slack.
Importantly, the future of preferences for ESG among stakeholders is as uncertain to managers as it is to us. Much of the
evidence we marshal for shifting Millennial preferences is similar
to the market research that drives corporate decision-making. Indeed, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink has been explicit about the role
Millennials play in their stewardship strategy.63 While other
61 José Azar et al., The Big Three and Corporate Carbon Emissions Around the
World, 142 J. FIN. ECON. 674, 674 (2021) (“[W]e observe a strong and robust negative association between Big Three ownership and subsequent carbon emissions among MSCI
index constituents, a pattern that becomes stronger in the later years of the sample period
as the three institutions publicly commit to tackle Environmental, Social, and Governance
(ESG) issues.”).
62 Jonathan C. Peterson et al., Do People Really Become More Conservative as They
Age?, 82 J. POL. 600, 600–11 (2020).
63 Profit & Purpose, supra note 43.
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firms have not been as vocal, the evidence is clear that they perceive and respond to the same trends that we document. These
trends may shift and predictions about the future may be incorrect, but the fact is that investors and managers are acting on
their best guesses about where things are headed, and that appears to be a future in which ESG continues to play an important
role.
The comparison between the market for ESG and the market
for corporate control is important in another way. Arguably, the
market for ESG may discipline managers more effectively in our
framework than in the conventional market for corporate control
as analyzed. For Easterbrook and Fischel, market discipline
hinged on firm value. Product markets didn’t care about the quality of firm governance, and shareholders cared about governance
practices only to the extent it led to a difference in stock price. If
firms offer poor governance, their stock value will decline, limiting their ability to raise capital and to be profitable. Thus, in the
traditional market-discipline framework of Easterbrook and
Fischel, the market for corporate control responds to firms’ prospects for long-term profitability and impounds information about
governance only instrumentally.
In our framework, consumers, employees, and investors care
about ESG directly, as part of their utility function, and accordingly respond to ESG information. Other market participants
care about ESG indirectly due to its potential impact on them,
sometimes regardless of or even despite firm value.
C. Transparency and Markets for Information
Information is the lifeblood of markets of all kinds, and the
market for ESG is no exception. Corporate disclosure has long
generated reams of information about the financial state of public
firms, the sort of information traditionally used to price securities. The accuracy of stock prices is critical to the market for corporate control and extensive mandatory disclosure ensures comparability and standardization of financial disclosures across
firms.
In the ESG space, the market has far exceeded regulatory requirements when it comes to disclosure. Competing disclosure
frameworks from SASB, GRI, and others, backed by disclosure
ratings, have created strong market incentives for transparency.
Given that many of the demands for disclosure come from shareholders rather than other stakeholders, firms have found it
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difficult to decline requests for information that can be reasonably made available.
The growth in ESG disclosures has naturally raised questions about what disclosures should be mandatory. The robust
growth in ESG disclosures without regulation lowers the stakes
of the debate, but our markets approach to ESG is helpful in contemplating the potential role of regulation in the ESG disclosure
space.
A comparison to earlier disclosure mandates related to ESG
is helpful. Consider the conflict mineral disclosures enacted as
part of the Dodd-Frank Act. These disclosures were not a product
of investor demand. They were enacted by legislative fiat and
aimed not at improving the occurrence of stock prices, but at embarrassing companies into addressing social problems related to
raw materials production. By forcing firms to disclose, the conflict
minerals requirements would make it easier for activists to bring
pressure to bear on problematic firms who were forced to be open
about their supply chain. This type of name-and-shame disclosure, of which the CEO pay ratio disclosure is also an example, is
not a product of market forces despite being related to ESG issues—at least, not at the time Dodd-Frank passed.
It is important to distinguish these earlier types of disclosure
requirements from the current state of play. Consider the new
ESG-relevant disclosure requirements related to human capital.
As of 2020, firms are required to make disclosures related to their
employee relations under Item 101(c)(1)(xiii) of Regulation S-K64
including:
A description of the registrant’s human capital resources, including the number of persons employed by the registrant,
and any human capital measures or objectives that the registrant focuses on in managing the business (such as, depending on the nature of the registrant’s business and workforce,
measures or objectives that address the development, attraction and retention of personnel).65
The ESG valence of such a disclosure is fairly clear, but the origin
of this new disclosure mandate is not only labor groups, but investors as well.66
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17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240 (2020).
17 C.F.R. § 229 (2020) (emphasis added).
66 See Members, HUMAN CAP. MGMT. COAL., https://perma.cc/8A38-LRA2 (last visited
Feb. 8, 2022).
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There are two reasons investors might want this information.
First, businesses increasingly rely on human capital for their success. It is reasonable for investors to want to better understand
how companies manage risks related to human capital. But there
is another reason as well: Companies’ relations with their workforce are a source of ESG risk. Low pay, mistreatment, or sexual
misconduct by management can all result in high-profile scandals
that damage consumer demand or lead to investor backlash. This
can be true even at firms that don’t rely on high-skill, highly paid
workers. Thus, investors need human capital information because it is a business risk in itself, but also because it is a source
of ESG risk that could have business consequences arising out of
other stakeholders as well.
While critics of the new disclosure complain that the SEC is
attempting to illicitly promote environmental and social goals
through disclosure,67 the truth is that investors need socially-relevant information to manage the risk of genuine economic harm
arising out of firms being insufficiently attentive to social issues
that matter to other stakeholders. What is true of human capital,
is true of a host of other salient risks: what matters to stakeholders will increasingly matter to investors, even those not seeking
to promote ESG goals themselves.
D. Concerns
Our account of ESG predicts that managers may engage in
excessive, misallocated, or defensive ESG. First, managers may
use firms’ resources to mitigate personal risk to their reputation
and career prospects. Second, index fund managers may compete
aggressively to attract and retain assets under management, by
increasing the level of their ESG activism, regardless of, and even
at the expense of, its effects on shareholder value.
Second, CEOs may respond to ESG pressure by engaging in
“greenwashing,” that is, exaggerating or fabricating claims that a
company’s products are environmentally friendly.68
Third, the issues that draw the most attention will be the
ones salient to relatively young, wealthy, highly skilled professionals active on social media. These are disproportionately individuals with money to invest, leverage as employees, and
67 David R. Burton, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Regarding the Modernization
of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105 (Oct. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/9HDZ-6F5E.
68 See, e.g., Will Kenton, Greenwashing, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 22, 2022),
https://perma.cc/S7LP-RBMM; Greenwashing, WIKIPEDIA, https://perma.cc/XR5D-KDEW
(last visited Apr. 10, 2022).
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flexibility to be choosy in consumer markets. A casual survey of
the ESG landscape suggests that the prediction that ESG is oriented toward this population survives at least a brush with reality.
But, if ESG is based on social values and aggregated individual preferences, then it operates as a largely exogenous constraint, and not itself as a product of market forces. Other-regarding preferences are complicated and fraught. How well do
individuals actually do at identifying important social issues to
address? How effective can they be in operationalizing concerns
for stakeholders whose interests they may not fully understand?
Will pressure on managers to, say, improve working conditions
lead to better outcomes for put-upon workers, or will it lead fewer
employees altogether, or—worse—a shift in production to offshore facilities away from prying eyes.
Moreover, the issues that attract Millennial attention may or
may not be the ones with the largest social impact or most human
welfare at stake, much less the ones connected to long-term firm
profitability, or even returns at a portfolio level. Asset managers
will engage on ESG issues when those issues are salient to powerful stakeholders, because failing to satisfy stakeholder preferences can have serious consequences for firm value, but it doesn’t
follow that the salient set of concerns is optimal in any robust
sense. Some of the old concerns about managers having too much
discretion in a stakeholder model may reappear in the form of
managers beholden to stakeholders with ill-advised ESG goals.
A long-term risk is that preferences push managers in the
direction of “the wrong kind” of ESG to address pressing social
issues, and there is no obvious market corrective to this dynamic.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Markets shape firms, and managers respond to incentives.
When demand changes, firms adjust. We are witnessing a dramatic shift in demand of a sort that has no clear analog in corporate law. The result is managers facing strong incentives, through
multiple channels, to address stakeholder interests. Our argument is that these forces are best conceptualized as a constraint,
just as the market for corporate control is a constraint. The ESG
ecosystem consists of investors, managers, and other stakeholders attempting to satisfy their preferences subject to these new
constraints.
Some of these forces may produce ESG that maximizes shareholder value. Some may attain socially-valuable goals even at the
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expense of shareholder value. And some may lead to production
of ESG to mitigate managers’ personal risk, and maximize index
funds flows, regardless of both shareholder and stakeholder
value.

